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Introduction
A social dilemma is a situation where the interest of the
individual conflicts with the preference of the collective [1]. Each
person entangled in a social dilemma has rational arguments to
follow a behavior that in the aggregate leads to unfavorable
outcomes for the collective. Social dilemmas are found in diverse
contexts. For example, economic social dilemmas include
problems associated with the provision of public goods such as
national security, public health and environmental protection,
where individuals can make investments into a common pool to
provide a costly, non-excludable asset that benefits all regardless of
how much they contribute to creating it [2–5]. Such ‘‘collective
action’’ problems [6–8] are not limited to human social behavior.
Biology abounds with examples of social dilemmas. Foraging yeast
cells secrete enzymes to lyse their environment, producing a
valuable common good that can be used by other cells [9]; groups
of meerkats take turns as sentinels and give eventual alarm calls to
the group [10]. Given the relevance of a large number of situations
that correspond to the definition of social dilemma, the scientific
community has expended significant capital to model and propose
solutions to social dilemmas.
In the most common formalization, social dilemmas are
modeled as games in which players follow different strategies.
Social dilemma games are characterized by the presence of at least
one deficient equilibrium: a situation that is an equilibrium, so no
player has incentives to change his behavior individually, but it is
not Pareto optimal, because there exists at least another possible
outcome that every player prefers to the current one. Often the
strategy that is collectively preferred is considered cooperative;
therefore cooperators provide a benefit to the group at some cost
while defectors exploit the group by reaping the benefits without
bearing the costs of cooperation.
Proposed methods of avoiding the generally undesirable
outcomes of social dilemmas vary widely and frequently depend
on context. Kollock [11] classifies these methods based on whether
players are assumed egoist and whether they can change the rules
of the game. His classification divides solutions to social dilemmas
into motivational [12–16], strategic [17–20] or structural
[2,12,21–32] (See Figure 1). In motivational solutions like moral
persuasion, a player gives some weight to the results other players
obtain. In strategic solutions such as reciprocity, conditional
association and grim triggers, an egoistic player influences other
players’ behavior by expanding the range of strategies he
considers. Neither solution requires coordinated or top-down
modifications of the rules of the game. In structural solutions such
as sanctions, central authority or privatization, the rules of the
game are changed to solve the dilemma.
A mixed structural-strategic solution proposed to obtain
collectively rational outcomes in social dilemmas is a sanction
system in which each player can punish other players that deviate
from cooperation. This type of self-imposed norm has the crucial
advantage of giving the players the opportunity to sanction norm
deviants selectively [33]. Behaviorally, ‘‘a norm exists in a given
social setting to the extent that individuals usually act in a certain
way and are often punished when seen not to be acting in this
way’’ [34]. This notion of norms is based on social norm as
opposed to legal norms, moral norms, private norms, habits or
fads [35]. [36,37] contain more extensive reviews of the meaning
of social norms, and [38,39] discuss the sociological and economic
foundations of norms while [40] couches social norms in
evolutionary game theory. Nevertheless, this mechanism to
promote cooperation can be riddled with difficulties if punishment
is costly. The punisher usually assumes the cost of promoting
punishment or vigilance. This punishment cost instigates a second
order ‘‘instrumental dilemma’’ in which players have incentives to
not punish, hence causing the solution to the first ‘‘elemental
dilemma’’ to collapse [41].
Second-order norm deviance has been studied experimentally
[41]. For instance, in a controlled experiment subjects were given
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the option to learn of others’ contributions to a public good before
deciding to punish them. This mechanism mitigated the free-rider
problem to some extent [3], but it created other problems like
punishing high contributors [42]. A plethora of other ideas have
been suggested as solutions. The threat of expulsion or ostracism
seems to improve the cooperation in providing public goods [43].
Costly signaling, may result in advantageous alliances, since
cooperation constitutes an honest signal of the member’s quality as
a coalition partner or competitor [44,45]. Hypocritical coopera-
tion, that is, defecting at the first level while urging others to
cooperate through participation in the sanctioning system, creates
more robust second-order cooperation [46]. Conformism as a
psychological bias toward copying the majority can also help to
stabilize cooperation [47]. group selection mechanisms, competi-
tion at two different levels, within groups and between groups
[48,49] or indirect reciprocity, the idea that good reputation will
be rewarded by others, [50] have also proven to promote
cooperative behavior.
The insufficiency of selective punishment as a condition to
promote cooperation in social dilemmas prompted Axelrod to
propose metanorms, that is, norms about how individuals follow
other norms, as a mechanism to support collective cooperation in
social dilemmas in evolutionary contexts [34]. Although contro-
versial [51,52], metanorms are touted as a mechanism for
sustainable cooperative strategies in which players adhere to
norms, punish defectors, and punish those who do not punish
defectors [33,38] . Mathematical analysis coupled with extensive
simulation has shown that metanorms can induce both collectively
and individually rational stable equilibria and that the efficiency of
metanorms as a solution to social dilemmas depends on the
structure of the payoff matrix. Incentives for not following norms
can counterintuitively enhance the preservation of the cooperative
solution; decay in punishment can cause the norm to collapse; and
the details of the evolutionary algorithm, for example more
explorative strategies denoted by higher levels of mutation noise,
can help to preserve the norm [53]. These results suggest that
metanorms as a solution to social dilemmas cannot be considered
universal, because the context of the specific problem can
influence its efficacy.
All theoretical research on metanorms conducted so far has
assumed an evolutionary game played on a global interaction
network where every player interacts with all other players.
However, a more realistic view of social interactions entails
embedding players in social networks that differ markedly from a
completely connected interaction graph [54]. Network structures
that underlie social interactions affect outcomes of such interac-
Figure 1. Examples of methods of solving social dilemmas based on Kollock’s ontology [11]. Solutions to social dilemmas can be
classified as motivational, strategic or structural depending on whether players are assumed egoist and whether the rules of the game can be
changed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020474.g001
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tions; therefore shape solutions to social dilemmas. Some
experimental research has sought to account for the effect of
network structure on social dilemmas [55,56]. Furthermore,
experimental works on dynamics of norm enforcement and
metanorms suggest that characteristics of social relations, espe-
cially interdependence, influence the emergence of norms
significantly [57–61]. This finding implies that we may overlook
relevant aspects of the problem by focusing on the direct
consequences of sanctioning norm deviance without accounting
for the properties of social relations over which norms and
metanorms are defined. Consequently, understanding the role of
network structures is essential for explaining norm enforcement.
Given that different topologies or structures of social networks can
influence outcomes of social interactions [54], we adapt the
metanorms game to arbitrary interaction networks and analyze the
influence of network topology on the emergence of cooperation
through mathematical analysis and computer simulation This hybrid
methodological approach has proven to be useful in analyzing
complex social models [62,63] and extends the growing literature on
games on networks [64–77] that is currently evolving from stylized
network structures to more general interaction topologies.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we extend the
metanorms game to play on networks. We then examine the
dynamics and stability of a simplified version of the metanorms
game mathematically. Next, we present simulation results to
confirm some of the conclusions obtained analytically. Finally we
present the conclusions of the work.
Methods
Metanorms Games on Networks
We set up the metanorms game on networks by embedding 50
agents on a network developed by a network generation algorithm.
We use 50 agents instead of 20 in Axelrod’s default setting to make
higher-order network statistics more interpretable. We used the
Baraba´si-Albert algorithm to generate networks with discrete Pareto
degree distributions [78], the Watts algorithm [79] with different
values of rewiring probability (b) that smoothly interpolates between
extreme cases of a regular lattice and a random network, traversing
‘‘small world’’ networks [80] along the way, and the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
random networks [55]. A link between two agents represents an
opportunity for direct interaction between them. A set of all direct
links to an agent is the neighborhood of the agent. To explore the
effect of clustering in the networks more clearly, we have also
considered agents with a distance or radius of two where radius is
defined as the minimum number of edges that it takes to link one
agent to another (See Figure 2).
Once agents are embedded on the underlying network
structure, they play a repeated game that consists of three
decisions or stages:
1. Agents decide whether to cooperate or defect. A defecting
agent obtains Temptation payoff (T = 3) and inflicts on each of
the remaining agents in the population Hurt payoff (H =21).
If agents cooperate, no one’s payoff is altered. Here we assume
that the spillover cost of defection is global.
2. Agents observe other agents in their neighborhood who
defected in stage 1 with a certain probability. For each
observed defection, agents decide whether to punish the
defector or not. Punishment is costly: one must pay
Enforcement cost (E =22) to impose Punishment cost
(P =29) on the defector. The opportunity to observe defection,
and hence the possibility to punish it, is conditional on the
existence of a link connecting defectors and punishers.
3. The third step includes the concept of metanorms: agents who
fail to punish observed defection should be punished. Similar to
the previous step, an agent who fails to punish an observed
defection may not be caught. The probability of being seen not
Figure 2. Examples of network topologies obtained with the network generation algorithms. Six sample networks with N= 50 and k¯= 2.
For Watts’ small world network, rewiring probability b was set to 0.2. Subfigures A—C on the upper panel represent networks with radius 1.
Subfigures D—E on the lower panel have neighborhoods expanded to radius 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020474.g002
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punishing a defecting agent given that defection is observed is
the same as the probability of observing such defection.
Network topology plays a critical role in this step: it determines
who can see unpunished defection. Observing a defection
requires links among the defector, un-punishing agent and
metapunisher. A metapunisher pays Meta-enforcement cost
(ME =22) to meta-punish (MP =29) an agent who decided
not to punish a defector.
Parameters boldness and vengefulness characterize an agent’s
strategy. Boldness is an agent’s propensity to defect, and
determines the outcome of the first stage of the game. An agent
that can defect will defect, if its boldness is greater than a
random probability of being observed. Vengefulness is an
agent’s propensity to punish agents that it has observed
defecting in the second stage of the game and to meta-punish
agents that it has observed not punishing a defecting agent in
the third. An agent punishes observed defectors or observed un-
punishers with a probability equal to vengefulness. Following
the original implementation by Axelrod, boldness and venge-
fulness are set as 3-bit strings denoting eight evenly distributed
values from 0 to 1 (0/7, 1/7, …,7/7). Initial values of agents’
boldness and vengefulness are determined randomly at the
beginning of each simulation run and updated by an
evolutionary mechanism.
The game is played four rounds called a generation. At the
beginning of each generation, agents’ payoffs are set to zero; at
the end of a generation all payoffs for each round are
accumulated and computed for each agent, and agents can
change their strategies according to evolutionary forces of
selection and mutation. We have adapted to local network
structures a variant of selection mechanisms called roulette
wheel in which the most successful agents in a given generation
are the most likely to spread [81]: an agent picks a strategy
played by other agents in its neighborhood with probability
proportional to the other agents’ fitness where an agent’s fitness
is equal to the difference between its payoff and the minimum
payoff obtained in the neighborhood. Whenever an agent
replicates a bitstring by invoking the selection mechanism,
every bit of the bitstring has a certain probability of being
flipped from 0 to 1 and vice versa called mutation rate. The game
continues with a new generation playing with new agent
strategies.
Results
Mathematical analysis
Given a specific network structure, the state of the game is a
certain realization of agents’ joint strategies, so the number of
possible game states is 6450 corresponding to 64 strategies that any
of the 50 players may choose. For any positive mutation rate, the
model is an irreducible positive recurrent and ergodic discrete-
time finite Markov chain [63], since the mutation operator
guarantees the non-zero probability of transition from any state to
any other state in one single step. This observation means that in
the long run, the probability of finding the metanorms game in
any of its states is non-zero and independent of the initial
conditions of the game. This result guides our simulation
experiments, because it guarantees that if we run simulations for
long enough the limiting distribution approximates to the
occupancy distribution.
The size of the state space of the game makes calculating the
transition matrix of the Markov chain infeasible. We have to resort
to other strategies to gain insights from a mathematical analysis of
the model. In this section we propose a simpler mathematical
abstraction of the metanorms game that is amenable to
mathematical analysis and graphic visualization. This abstracted
model suggests areas of stability and basins of attraction in the
model and illustrates the expected dynamics of the metanorms
graphically. We should stress that the conclusions of this analysis
come from the simplified model, not the original one, so they must
be verified by simulation.
Let’s begin formalizing the model. Assume an undirected
network C~(N,L) defined by a set of agents N~ 1,2,:::,nf gas
nodes and a set of unweighted links among them L(N|N. The
payoff of agent i playing the metanorms game is defined by:
Payoffi~Defi:Tz
Xn
j~1
j=i
Defj :Hz
Xzi
j~1
j[Ni
Punij :Ez
Xzi
j~1
j[Ni
Punji:Pz
Xzi
j~1
j[Ni
Xzj
k~1
k[Ni\k[Nj
ME:Defk:(1{Punjk):Punijz
Xzi
j~1
j[Ni
Xzj
k~1
k[Ni\k[Nj
MP:Defk:(1{Punik):Punji
ð1Þ
where T, H, E, P, ME, MP are the payoffs of the model, n is the
number of agents, and Ni: j [N : ij [ Lf g is the set of agents
linked to any given i [N. This set defines the neighborhood of i.
zi: Nij j denotes the number of neighbors or degrees for agent i.
Two indicator functions are also used:
Defi~
1 If agent i defects Prob (Defi:1)~bi
0 If agent i cooperates Prob (Defi:0)~1{bi

Punij ~
1 If agent i punishes agent j Prob (Punij:1)~bj : bj

2
 :vi
0 If agent i does not punish agent j Prob (Punij:0)~1{bj : bj

2
 :vi
(
and vengefulness and boldness for each agent is denoted as vi and
bi. Using vengefulness and boldness we calculate the expected
payoff of agent i in one round as:
Exp(Payoff )i~bi
:TzH
Xn
j~1
j=i
bjzE
vi
2
Xzi
j~1
j[Ni
b2jzP
b2i
2
Xzi
j~1
j[Ni
vjz
ME
vi
4
Xzi
j~1
j[Ni
Xzj
k~1
k[Ni\k[Nj
:b3k
:(1{vj)z
MP
1{vi
4
Xzi
j~1
j[Ni
Xzj
k~1
k[Ni\k[Nj
b3kvj
ð2Þ
Eq. 2 depends on the exact realization of the network topology
and exact strategies of each agent in the network. Let us now
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rewrite the Eq. 2 in terms of common statistics of the network
topology.
First, let p(k)~
1
n
i [N : zi~k
   be the first-order degree
distribution of network C. The clustering of an agent i with at least
two neighbors is defined as:
Ci:
jk [ L : ij [ L ^ ik [ Lf gj j
zi(zi{1)
2
We define clustering coefficient for a degree in a given network
as:
C(k)~
Pn
i~1
zi~k
Ci
i [N : zi~k
  
Assuming homogeneity in vengefulness and boldness
Vi [N,v
i
~v and b
i
~b in the population, we can simplify the
expected payoff of agent i as follows:
Exp(Payoff )i~bi
:TzH(n{1)bzE
vi
2
b
2:kz
P
b2i
2
v:kzME
vi
4
b
3
(1{v)
Xn{1
d~1
p(ki~d):C(d):d:(d{1)z
MP
1{vi
4
b
3
v
Xn{1
d~1
p(ki~d):C(d):d:(d{1)
ð3Þ
Eq. 3 expresses expected payoffs of homogeneous agents on a
given network as a function of the first degree distribution,
clustering distribution and the average degree k of the network.
INCONN(C)~
Xn{1
d~1
p(ki~d):C(d):d:(d{1) represents the aver-
age number of triplets per agent in network C. We call this statistic
interconnectedness of network C. In other words, the dynamics and
expected outcomes of the metanorms game may be highly
influenced by the agents’ average number of interactions and a
certain measure of clustering of these interactions.
To characterize the long run outcomes of the game, we use the
concept of evolutionary stable state (ESS) to identify the stability points
of the game. This notion is inspired by the ideas proposed by
Maynard Smith and Price [82] and developed by Weibull [83] and
Colman [84]. An ESS in the metanorms game [53] is a state where:
N Every agent in the population H receives the same expected
payoff, so evolutionary selection pressures will not lead the
system away from the state,
Exp(Payoffi)~Exp(Payoffj) Vi, j [H
.
N Any agent m that changes its strategy with bm as its new
boldness and vm its new vengefulness, receives a strictly lower
expected payoff than any other agent in the incumbent
population I ; H-{m}, so if a single mutation occurs, the
mutant agent will not be able to invade the population:
Exp(Payoffm)vExp(Payoffj) Vm [H; Vi [ I(m 6 [ I)
.
N Once a single agent m has changed its strategy, all other agents
in the incumbent population I receive the same expected
payoff, so a single mutant cannot distort the composition of the
population except maybe by random drift:
Exp(Payoffi)~Exp(Payoffj) Vm [H; Vi, j [ I(m 6 [ I)
.
These three conditions above are enough to expect that any
mutant will be removed from the game, providing strong
restriction for stability in the dynamics of the model. If the system
is not homogeneous, these conditions are not sufficient to
guarantee in general that, if they are fulfilled in a certain state,
the system will tend to revert to such a state after a single mutation.
If the three conditions prevail in a certain state, we expect any
mutant to be removed from the game, but the specific strategy
among the incumbent population that will replace the mutant
depends on the selection mechanism.
At this point we can establish two necessary conditions for a
state to be evolutionary stable by assuming continuity in agent
properties in Eq. 3. Let m be an arbitrary, but potentially mutant,
agent with bm as its boldness and vm as its vengefulness in a given
population of agents H. Let I be the set of incumbent agents in the
population H excluding m. The following equation is a necessary
condition for the population of agents to be in ESS. This condition
can be easily grasped by realizing that if every agent has the same
expected payoff as the necessary condition for ESS, and Eq. 4 does
not hold for some agents m and i, the potentially mutant m can get
a differential advantage over incumbent i by changing its boldness
bm, meaning that the state under study cannot be evolutionary
stable:
LExp(Payoffm)
Lbm
~
LExp(Payoffi)
Lbm
Vi [ I
OR bm~1AND
LExp(Payoffm)
Lbm
§ LExp(Payoffi)
Lbm
Vi [ I
	 

OR bm~0AND
LExp(Payoffm)
Lbm
ƒ LExp(Payoffi)
Lbm
Vi [ I
	 

8>>>>><
>>>>>:
9>>>>>=
>>>>>;
Vm [ H ð4Þ
Similarly, we can obtain another necessary condition by
substituting vm for bm in Eq. 4.
LExp(Payoffm)
Lvm
~
LExp(Payoffi)
Lvm
V i[ I
OR vm~1AND
LExp(Payoffm)
Lvm
§ LExp(Payoffi)
Lvm
Vi [ I
	 

OR vm~0AND
LExp(Payoffm)
Lvm
ƒ LExp(Payoffi)
Lvm
Vi [ I
	 

8>>>><
>>>>:
9>>>>=
>>>>;
Vm [ H ð5Þ
(4)
(5)
Axelrod’s Metanorm Games on Networks
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 May 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 5 | e20474
We can use Eq. 3 to evaluate the necessary derivatives:
LExp(Payoff )m
Lbm
~TzP:b:v:k
LExp(Payoff )i
Lbm
~Hz
E:v:b:k
n{1
z
INCONN(C):(ME
3v
4(n{1)
b
2
(1{v)z
MP
3(1{v)
4(n{1)
b
2
v)
ð6Þ
LExp(Payoff )m
Lvm
~
E
2
b
2:kz
INCONN(C):(ME
b
3
(1{v)
4
{MP
b
3
v
4
)
LExp(Payoff )i
Lvm
~P
b
2
2(n{1)
kz
INCONN(C):(MP
1{v
4(n{1)
b
3
{ME
v
4(n{1)
b
3
)
Generalizing the demonstration provided in [53], it can be
proved that the system may have two different ESS, one where the
norm collapses (bi = 1, vi = 0 for all i) and eventually another where
the norm is established. This last ESS only appears depending on
the relation between the average degree and the average number
of triplets by agent, features that are determined by the network
topology of the game.
Evaluating gradients from Eq. 6 for any network topology and
population characteristics leads to gradient maps of predicted
population movements. The legend for these maps is described on
Figure 3. For any constant value of average degree, the theoretical
analysis suggests that the higher the average number of triplets, the
more likely a cooperative ESS is to emerge and the bigger the size
of its basin of attraction. On the contrary, for a constant average
number of triplets, the higher average degree, the less likely a
cooperative ESS is to emerge. Moreover, we can numerically
calculate the minimum average number of triplets for each
average degree in order to have an ESS in the area of norm
establishment and compare it with different network topologies
(Figure 4).
Simulation
The results derived from the previous section are suggestive but
we should keep in mind that they could have been obtained as
consequences of simplifying assumptions not directly from the
model explained in section two, since we abstracted the
evolutionary mechanisms and the details of network topology,
imposed continuity on agent properties, and worked only in terms
of expected behavior. We need to verify if the suggested hypotheses
in the equation-based approach can be generalized to the original
metanorms game. Since that model, and especially when it is
played on networks, is very complex, we have to resort to extensive
simulation to gain insights on how it evolves. All simulations can
be replicated with the source code of the model provided at
http://josema.galan.name/models.
In the experiment designed to verify the behavior of the
metanorms mechanism, we use the same payoff matrix, mutation
rate and number of rounds per generation as in Axelrod’s original
paper (see Table 1).
We used the network generation algorithms mentioned in the
previous section to create a sample of 6000 networks. The density
of the sampled networks is plotted in Figure 5, projected onto the
average degree against clustering coefficient of the network and
the square root of the interconnectedness spaces. Note that
clustering, interconnectedness and the average degree are not
independent variables.
The results obtained from simulations allow us to perform two
types of analyses, an analysis of the long-run limiting behavior of
metanorms, and an analysis of the dynamics to compare with the
expected dynamics predicted by the simplified theoretical model.
To study the influence of the network topology on the long-run
behavior of the model, recall that when mutation rate is greater than
zero, the metanorms game on networks is a time-homogeneous
Markov chain (THMC) in which the limiting distribution coincides
with the occupancy distribution as the long-run fraction of the time
that the THMC spends in each state. Therefore, we can
approximate the limiting distribution by computing the frequency
of simulation in each state. We have defined the following zones:
N Norm Collapse: the simulation is in states where the average
boldness is at least 6/7 and the average vengefulness is no
more than 1/7.
Figure 3. Legend for gradient maps. The map applies to both
analytic and simulated gradient landscapes. The axes represent the
average boldness and vengefulness of the population as its strategic
characteristics. For each point, we measure the direction and speed of
population drift. For analytical landscapes, we will also pinpoint the
expected location of the evolutionary stable states. For simulation
landscapes, we will be measuring the time that the simulation spends in
each of the two key regions: norm emergence and norm collapse zones.
Sample maps for different network topologies are shown in Figure 7.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020474.g003
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N Norm Establishment: the simulation is in states where average
boldness is no more than 1/7 and average vengefulness is at
least 6/7.
We have computed the time that a single simulation is in either
zone. In Figure 6 we have measured the long-run fraction of time,
averaged over runs and over network topologies that the
simulation is in cooperative norm emergence and collapse zones
as a function of average degree and root square of interconnec-
tedness and as function of average degree and clustering coefficient
of the network. First, these results suggest that the ESS obtained
analytically in the simplified model are in fact the only ESS in the
system since the time that the simulation is out of these two zones
is not significant.
Second, we observe that on average the influence of average
degree, the number of triplets and clustering coefficient behave as
predicted analytically. The higher the average number of triplets
the more time the simulation spends in norm establishment zone;
on the contrary, for a given average number of triplets, the higher
average degree of the network, the lower the probability of finding
the simulation in the norm establishment zone. These results
suggest that an important part of the limiting behavior of the game
can be explained by two simple statistics of the network topology.
Last, we have found some variance in the results. For example,
we do find the norm establishment in sparser networks that are
analytically predicted not to reach the norm establishment zone.
This indicates that agent and network heterogeneity, for example
local ‘‘clumps’’ denser than the whole network by chance, and the
specifics of the evolutionary mechanism also play important roles
in norm establishment as they may allow for ‘‘seeding’’ the
cooperative norm in the network [67,85,86].
We have also analyzed data from simulation to determine the
match between gradient maps obtained in the simplified
mathematical analysis and simulation model dynamics. The first
Figure 4. Minimal interconnectedness necessary for a cooperative evolutionary stable state. Minimal interconnectedness necessary for a
cooperative evolutionary stable state to exist in the simplified analytical model for any given average degree of the network, compared to the
expected interconnectedness of different network topologies with radius 1. Default metanorms parameters are assumed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020474.g004
Table 1. Summary of parameters used in the experiment.
Parameter Value
Number of agents 50
Number of generations 50000
Mutation rate 0.01
Temptation payoff T= 3
Hurt payoff H=21
Enforcement payoff E=22
Punishment payoff P=29
Meta-enforcement payoff ME=22
Meta-punishment payoff MP=29
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020474.t001
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Figure 5. Distribution of tested data points obtained by sampling network topologies with radius 1 and 2. The distribution of the
sampled network topologies, projected onto two dimensional views of key network statistics. The left panel shows sampled network topologies
projected onto the square root of interconnectedness and the average degree of the network, while the right panel describes the sample density in
the average degree and the clustering coefficient space.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020474.g005
Figure 6. Proportion of time spent in the emergence and collapse zones. Proportion of time that the simulation spends in the norm collapse
and emergence zones as a function of key network statistics using similar projections as those in Figure 5. Color codes the fraction of simulation time
spent in each zone computed for each bin. Time spent outside either zone is insignificant.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020474.g006
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column of Figure 7 represents the mathematically predicted
dynamics, whereas the second column presents simulated speed
and direction of population drift. We observe that in terms of
speed and direction of trajectories the predicted dynamics match,
especially for those cases where there is only one clear ESS or two
ESSs. The interesting result appears when there is only one
Figure 7. Predicted versus observed dynamics of the metanorms game for three networks. For simulated results, the mutation rate was
set to 0.01. Color codes the speeds of movement of the population, either computed analytically or measured from the simulation with blue being
the slowest and red the fastest. Figure 3 contains the legend for the graphs. In panel B, simulated population spends 95% of time in norm collapse
zone. In panel D, the proportion of time in the norm collapse zone drops to 50%. In panel E, the simulation spends 95% of time in the norm
emergence zone and 5% in the norm collapse zone.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020474.g007
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predicted ESS but we are close to having another in the zone of
norm establishment. The observed dynamics show possible quasi-
stable states in norm emergence earlier than predicted by the
equation approach. This effect may be the consequence of
mutation rate and variance of selection mechanism that make it
difficult to escape from the norm establishment zone [53].
Discussion
We have adapted the theoretical model of metanorms to guide
agent interactions on static networks. Our analytical and
computational results show that the interaction structure influ-
ences the effectiveness of the metanorms mechanism. In particular,
we identified the average degree, clustering coefficient and
interconnectedness as the average number of triplets per agent
as key aspects that contribute to sustaining or collapsing norms of
cooperation in networked populations. Higher clustering coeffi-
cient and average number of triplets increases cooperative
behavior, suggesting that translating bilateral to trilateral interac-
tion promotes cooperation. Comparing the results of our simplified
mathematical analysis with those of computational modeling, we
have also shown that some evolutionary details influence in the
model dynamics that stabilize the zone of norm establishment.
The networks used for the analysis have been numerous and
diverse, nevertheless we have not analyzed all possible configura-
tions. Some recent studies [67,85–87] have proved that commu-
nity structure [88], subsets of nodes that are relatively densely
connected to each other but sparsely connected to other dense
groups, can be also an important parameter in the behavior of
games in networks, although the network generators used in our
analysis are not particularly designed to take into account this
effect. Further research may clarify the effect of more complex
topologies, particular evolutionary details or scale on the
effectiveness of metanorms as mechanism to sustain cooperation
in social dilemmas.
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